Publicaciones
Artículo
Guilt Without Fault: Accidental Agency in the Era of Autonomous Vehicles
Autores: Fernando Aguiar, Ivar R. Hannikainen, Pilar Aguilar
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00363-8
The control principle implies that people should not feel guilt for outcomes beyond their control. Yet, the so-called ‘agent and observer puzzles’ in philosophy demonstrate that people waver in their commitment to the control principle when reflecting on accidental outcomes. In the context of car accidents involving conventional or autonomous vehicles (AVs), Study 1 established that judgments of responsibility are most strongly associated with expressions of guilt–over and above other negative emotions, such as sadness, remorse or anger. Studies 2 and 3 then confirmed that, while people generally endorse the control principle, and deny that occupants in an AV should feel guilt when involved in an accident, they nevertheless ascribe guilt to those same occupants. Study 3 also uncovered novel implications of the observer puzzle in the legal context: Passengers in an AV were seen as more legally liable than either passengers in a conventional vehicle, or even their drivers–especially when participants were prompted to reflect on the passengers’ affective experience of guilt. Our findings document an important conflict–in the context of AV accidents–between people’s prescriptive reasoning about responsibility and guilt on one hand, and their counter-normative experience of guilt on the other, with apparent implications for liability decisions.
Guilt Without Fault: Accidental Agency in the Era of Autonomous Vehicles
Autores: Fernando Aguiar, Ivar R. Hannikainen, Pilar Aguilar
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00363-8
The control principle implies that people should not feel guilt for outcomes beyond their control. Yet, the so-called ‘agent and observer puzzles’ in philosophy demonstrate that people waver in their commitment to the control principle when reflecting on accidental outcomes. In the context of car accidents involving conventional or autonomous vehicles (AVs), Study 1 established that judgments of responsibility are most strongly associated with expressions of guilt–over and above other negative emotions, such as sadness, remorse or anger. Studies 2 and 3 then confirmed that, while people generally endorse the control principle, and deny that occupants in an AV should feel guilt when involved in an accident, they nevertheless ascribe guilt to those same occupants. Study 3 also uncovered novel implications of the observer puzzle in the legal context: Passengers in an AV were seen as more legally liable than either passengers in a conventional vehicle, or even their drivers–especially when participants were prompted to reflect on the passengers’ affective experience of guilt. Our findings document an important conflict–in the context of AV accidents–between people’s prescriptive reasoning about responsibility and guilt on one hand, and their counter-normative experience of guilt on the other, with apparent implications for liability decisions.
Artículo
How pills undermine skills: Moralization of cognitive enhancement and causal selection
Autores: Emilian Mihailov, Blanca Rodríguez, Florian Cova, Ivar R. Hannikainen
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103120
Despite the promise to boost human potential and wellbeing, enhancement drugs face recurring ethical scrutiny. The present studies examined attitudes toward cognitive enhancement in order to learn more about these ethical concerns, who has them, and the circumstances in which they arise. Fairness-based concerns underlay opposition to competitive use—even though enhancement drugs were described as legal, accessible and affordable. Moral values also influenced how subsequent rewards were causally explained: Opposition to competitive use reduced the causal contribution of the enhanced winner’s skill, particularly among fairness-minded individuals. In a follow-up study, we asked: Would the normalization of enhancement practices alleviate concerns about their unfairness? Indeed, proliferation of competitive cognitive enhancement eradicated fairness-based concerns, and boosted the perceived causal role of the winner’s skill. In contrast, purity-based concerns emerged in both recreational and competitive contexts, and were not assuaged by normalization.
How pills undermine skills: Moralization of cognitive enhancement and causal selection
Autores: Emilian Mihailov, Blanca Rodríguez, Florian Cova, Ivar R. Hannikainen
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2021.103120
Despite the promise to boost human potential and wellbeing, enhancement drugs face recurring ethical scrutiny. The present studies examined attitudes toward cognitive enhancement in order to learn more about these ethical concerns, who has them, and the circumstances in which they arise. Fairness-based concerns underlay opposition to competitive use—even though enhancement drugs were described as legal, accessible and affordable. Moral values also influenced how subsequent rewards were causally explained: Opposition to competitive use reduced the causal contribution of the enhanced winner’s skill, particularly among fairness-minded individuals. In a follow-up study, we asked: Would the normalization of enhancement practices alleviate concerns about their unfairness? Indeed, proliferation of competitive cognitive enhancement eradicated fairness-based concerns, and boosted the perceived causal role of the winner’s skill. In contrast, purity-based concerns emerged in both recreational and competitive contexts, and were not assuaged by normalization.
Artículo
Moral Bioenhancements and the Future of Utilitarianism
Autores: Francisco Lara
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2021-0016
Utilitarianism has been able to respond to many of the objections raised against it by undertaking a major revision of its theory. Basically, this consisted of recognising that its early normative propositions were only viable for agents very different from flesh-and-blood humans. They then deduced that, given human limitations, it was most useful for everyone if moral agents did not behave as utilitarians and habitually followed certain rules. Important recent advances in neurotechnology suggest that some of these human limitations can be overcome. In this article, after presenting some possible neuro-enhancements, we seek to answer the questions, first, of whether they should be accepted by a utilitarian ethic and, second, if accepted, to what extent they would invalidate the revision that allowed them to escape the objections.
Moral Bioenhancements and the Future of Utilitarianism
Autores: Francisco Lara
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2021-0016
Utilitarianism has been able to respond to many of the objections raised against it by undertaking a major revision of its theory. Basically, this consisted of recognising that its early normative propositions were only viable for agents very different from flesh-and-blood humans. They then deduced that, given human limitations, it was most useful for everyone if moral agents did not behave as utilitarians and habitually followed certain rules. Important recent advances in neurotechnology suggest that some of these human limitations can be overcome. In this article, after presenting some possible neuro-enhancements, we seek to answer the questions, first, of whether they should be accepted by a utilitarian ethic and, second, if accepted, to what extent they would invalidate the revision that allowed them to escape the objections.
Artículo
Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?
Autores: Francisco Lara
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00318-5
Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.
Why a Virtual Assistant for Moral Enhancement When We Could have a Socrates?
Autores: Francisco Lara
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-021-00318-5
Can Artificial Intelligence (AI) be more effective than human instruction for the moral enhancement of people? The author argues that it only would be if the use of this technology were aimed at increasing the individual's capacity to reflectively decide for themselves, rather than at directly influencing behaviour. To support this, it is shown how a disregard for personal autonomy, in particular, invalidates the main proposals for applying new technologies, both biomedical and AI-based, to moral enhancement. As an alternative to these proposals, this article proposes a virtual assistant that, through dialogue, neutrality and virtual reality technologies, can teach users to make better moral decisions on their own. The author concludes that, as long as certain precautions are taken in its design, such an assistant could do this better than a human instructor adopting the same educational methodology.
Artículo
Enhancing Virtue without Becoming Ned Flanders?
Autores: Jon Rueda
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2021.1904051
According to Fabiano, achieving a balanced enhancement of a variety of moral dispositions is necessary to avoid creating large-scale changes in individual moral traits that could have deleterious societal consequences. For instance, enhancing altruism can be hazardous if it increases the number of free-riders that exploit enhanced altruists. Thus, altruism or compassion should not only be enhanced to the right measure but also in the right context—as well as not decreasing the aggressiveness toward punishing cheaters. Call this argument the “Risk of Ned Flanderization”—name due to Ned Flanders, the fictional character and Good Samaritan stereotype frequently cheated by Homer in The Simpsons. This argument refers to the peril that moral enhancement can create easily exploitable persons that are especially vulnerable to egoistic and non-cooperative individuals.
Enhancing Virtue without Becoming Ned Flanders?
Autores: Jon Rueda
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2021.1904051
According to Fabiano, achieving a balanced enhancement of a variety of moral dispositions is necessary to avoid creating large-scale changes in individual moral traits that could have deleterious societal consequences. For instance, enhancing altruism can be hazardous if it increases the number of free-riders that exploit enhanced altruists. Thus, altruism or compassion should not only be enhanced to the right measure but also in the right context—as well as not decreasing the aggressiveness toward punishing cheaters. Call this argument the “Risk of Ned Flanderization”—name due to Ned Flanders, the fictional character and Good Samaritan stereotype frequently cheated by Homer in The Simpsons. This argument refers to the peril that moral enhancement can create easily exploitable persons that are especially vulnerable to egoistic and non-cooperative individuals.
Artículo
AI Ethics for Sustainable Development Goals
Autores: Aníbal Monasterio, Mario Toboso, Manuel Aparicio, Daniel López
DOI: 10.1109/MTS.2021.3056294
We live in an era where problems are global in scale (e.g., climate change) and solutions must also be coordinated on a global scale in the international context. The 2030 agenda for sustainable development goals (SDGs) was ratified in 2015 as a continuation of the millennium development goals (MDGs). In this sense, the SDGs, as MDGs were in their day, are a global mechanism that urges governments to coordinate to address global problems. At the core of the SDGs is “to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all.” The SDGs consist in a series of 17 goals with 169 targets which, for the first time, identify the fight against poverty as a necessity for sustainable development. The SDGs consider the ecological, social, and economic dimensions as interdependent for sustainable development. With the progress and advances of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, many researchers are exploring the possibility of their use to tackle societal problems. This is what many people nowadays call “AI for social good” (AI4SG). The concept behind AI4SG is very simple: AI-powered systems and capabilities applied to improve public welfare [1]. Although there are different forms of classification of AI4SG initiatives (in terms of data, modeling, or decision-making) “projects addressing AI4SG vary significantly” [2] and the AI behind these projects may have been designed for the “good” but, in practice, it could end up going “bad.” More importantly, not everyone would agree on what is a good result. The main motivation for any application of the AI4SG is to solve social problems.
AI Ethics for Sustainable Development Goals
Autores: Aníbal Monasterio, Mario Toboso, Manuel Aparicio, Daniel López
DOI: 10.1109/MTS.2021.3056294
We live in an era where problems are global in scale (e.g., climate change) and solutions must also be coordinated on a global scale in the international context. The 2030 agenda for sustainable development goals (SDGs) was ratified in 2015 as a continuation of the millennium development goals (MDGs). In this sense, the SDGs, as MDGs were in their day, are a global mechanism that urges governments to coordinate to address global problems. At the core of the SDGs is “to achieve a better and more sustainable future for all.” The SDGs consist in a series of 17 goals with 169 targets which, for the first time, identify the fight against poverty as a necessity for sustainable development. The SDGs consider the ecological, social, and economic dimensions as interdependent for sustainable development. With the progress and advances of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, many researchers are exploring the possibility of their use to tackle societal problems. This is what many people nowadays call “AI for social good” (AI4SG). The concept behind AI4SG is very simple: AI-powered systems and capabilities applied to improve public welfare [1]. Although there are different forms of classification of AI4SG initiatives (in terms of data, modeling, or decision-making) “projects addressing AI4SG vary significantly” [2] and the AI behind these projects may have been designed for the “good” but, in practice, it could end up going “bad.” More importantly, not everyone would agree on what is a good result. The main motivation for any application of the AI4SG is to solve social problems.
Artículo
Virtual Reality Not for “Being Someone” but for “Being Someone Else´s Shoes”: Avoiding Misconceptions in Empathy Enhancement
Autores: Francisco Lara y Jon Rueda
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.741516
In this article, we show that Ramirez et al.'s ethical rejection of empathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception of empathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promote empathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions.
Virtual Reality Not for “Being Someone” but for “Being Someone Else´s Shoes”: Avoiding Misconceptions in Empathy Enhancement
Autores: Francisco Lara y Jon Rueda
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.741516
In this article, we show that Ramirez et al.'s ethical rejection of empathy enhancement through VR is based on confusion. First, we show that this misunderstanding stems from the conception of empathy-enhancing simulations solely as failed attempts at “being someone else,” along with ignoring the crucial difference between the psychological perspective-taking processes of imagine-other and imagine-self. Then, having overcome that misconception, we argue that the ethical misgivings about the use of VR to promote empathy should disappear and that these projects have greater potential for behavioural change than purely sympathy-focused interventions.
Artículo
Gobernanza global de la IA
Autores: Aníbal Monasterio
DOI: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1399-5388
El desarrollo de la IA crece cada vez más y se aplica en casi todos los sectores económicos y/o sociales y, por consiguiente, nacen nuevas oportunidades, pero también nuevos retos. En este artículo, pretendo presentar algunos de estos nuevos retos, cuáles son las formas más apropiadas para afrontarlos y qué enfoque ético seguir para una gobernanza global de la IA. Para ello, en primer lugar, comentaré el proceso de difusión y penetración de la tecnología subrayando la inclinación humana de hacer uso de distintas herramientas para manipular y transformar la realidad. En segundo lugar, hablaré de la revolución digital y algunos desafíos que plantea para la sociedad y el individuo. Finalmente, presentaré un esbozo de los esfuerzos colectivos para la gobernanza global de la IA.
Gobernanza global de la IA
Autores: Aníbal Monasterio
DOI: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1399-5388
El desarrollo de la IA crece cada vez más y se aplica en casi todos los sectores económicos y/o sociales y, por consiguiente, nacen nuevas oportunidades, pero también nuevos retos. En este artículo, pretendo presentar algunos de estos nuevos retos, cuáles son las formas más apropiadas para afrontarlos y qué enfoque ético seguir para una gobernanza global de la IA. Para ello, en primer lugar, comentaré el proceso de difusión y penetración de la tecnología subrayando la inclinación humana de hacer uso de distintas herramientas para manipular y transformar la realidad. En segundo lugar, hablaré de la revolución digital y algunos desafíos que plantea para la sociedad y el individuo. Finalmente, presentaré un esbozo de los esfuerzos colectivos para la gobernanza global de la IA.
Artículo
Virtual Reality and Empathy Enhancement: Ethical Aspects
Autores: Francisco Lara, Jon Rueda
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2020.506984
The history of humankind is full of examples that indicate a constant desire to make human beings more moral. Nowadays, technological breakthroughs might have a significant impact on our moral character and abilities. This is the case of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies. The aim of this paper is to consider the ethical aspects of the use of VR in enhancing empathy. First, we will offer an introduction to VR, explaining its fundamental features, devices and concepts. Then, we will approach the characterization of VR as an “empathy machine,” showing why this medium has aroused so much interest and why, nevertheless, we do not believe it is the ideal way to enhance empathy. As an alternative, we will consider fostering empathy-related abilities through virtual embodiment in avatars. In the conclusion, however, we will examine some of the serious concerns related to the ethical relevance of empathy and will defend the philosophical case for a reason-guided empathy, also suggesting specific guidelines for possible future developments of empathy enhancement projects through VR embodied experiences.
Virtual Reality and Empathy Enhancement: Ethical Aspects
Autores: Francisco Lara, Jon Rueda
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/frobt.2020.506984
The history of humankind is full of examples that indicate a constant desire to make human beings more moral. Nowadays, technological breakthroughs might have a significant impact on our moral character and abilities. This is the case of Virtual Reality (VR) technologies. The aim of this paper is to consider the ethical aspects of the use of VR in enhancing empathy. First, we will offer an introduction to VR, explaining its fundamental features, devices and concepts. Then, we will approach the characterization of VR as an “empathy machine,” showing why this medium has aroused so much interest and why, nevertheless, we do not believe it is the ideal way to enhance empathy. As an alternative, we will consider fostering empathy-related abilities through virtual embodiment in avatars. In the conclusion, however, we will examine some of the serious concerns related to the ethical relevance of empathy and will defend the philosophical case for a reason-guided empathy, also suggesting specific guidelines for possible future developments of empathy enhancement projects through VR embodied experiences.
Artículo
Infoética y la paradoja de la privacidad: información pública por defecto, privada con esfuerzo
Autores: Aníbal Monasterio
DOI: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1399-5388
Adquirir y procesar información es parte fundamental de la vida. Gracias a la información se reduce la incertidumbre (entropía), lo que es crucial para ayudar a los individuos a adaptar su conducta a entornos fluctuantes. En nuestras sociedades actuales basadas en los datos, la información de carácter personal recolectada, usada y distribuida por las TICs (y potencialmente comercializable en la economía digital) ha despertado una sensibilización activa sobre la necesidad de un mayor control de esta información personal intensificando un deseo de privacidad. No obstante, el ecosistema digital de aplicaciones, plataformas y redes sociales nos prestan productos y servicios gratuitos a cambio de nuestros datos personales que posteriormente venden a terceras partes. Esto lleva a lo que se ha venido en llamar la paradoja de la privacidad: la gente tiene grandes preocupaciones sobre la privacidad, pero no actúa en consecuencia. En este artículo, haré un repaso de los conceptos de “información” y “dato” a la luz de la infoética y también presento un experimento simple ideado para valorar el alcance de la paradoja de la privacidad.
Infoética y la paradoja de la privacidad: información pública por defecto, privada con esfuerzo
Autores: Aníbal Monasterio
DOI: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1399-5388
Adquirir y procesar información es parte fundamental de la vida. Gracias a la información se reduce la incertidumbre (entropía), lo que es crucial para ayudar a los individuos a adaptar su conducta a entornos fluctuantes. En nuestras sociedades actuales basadas en los datos, la información de carácter personal recolectada, usada y distribuida por las TICs (y potencialmente comercializable en la economía digital) ha despertado una sensibilización activa sobre la necesidad de un mayor control de esta información personal intensificando un deseo de privacidad. No obstante, el ecosistema digital de aplicaciones, plataformas y redes sociales nos prestan productos y servicios gratuitos a cambio de nuestros datos personales que posteriormente venden a terceras partes. Esto lleva a lo que se ha venido en llamar la paradoja de la privacidad: la gente tiene grandes preocupaciones sobre la privacidad, pero no actúa en consecuencia. En este artículo, haré un repaso de los conceptos de “información” y “dato” a la luz de la infoética y también presento un experimento simple ideado para valorar el alcance de la paradoja de la privacidad.
